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ABSTRACT
This article examines the relation between emergency legal doctrine
and racial sovereignty in the context of Palestine. It theorises Israel’s
multifarious emergency modalities in a colonial present paradigm
where traditional territorial colonisation is fused with modern
security biopolitics. The Israeli juridical-security apparatus mimics
European liberal legalism in presenting itself as generally accepting
of human rights obligations, save in circumstances where particular
illiberal measures are necessitated on security grounds. These
measures, however, comprise a pervasive patchwork of emergency
modalities that have penetrated all spheres of Palestinian political,
economic and cultural life. The retention and application of the
British Mandate-era Defence Emergency Regulations as well as the
constitutional state of emergency have produced an emergency
marked by longevity and racialisation. Furthermore, Israel has
invoked the emergency derogation option under international
treaties to claim the legality of measures such as mass internment
without trial. I articulate these dynamics of legality, emergency and
sovereignty in terms of “repressive inclusion”: a racially contingent
inclusion within – and repression by – the juridical order. This
evokes the suffocating hold of racialised emergency legal
structures. The consequences for Palestinian lives and bodies have
been severe; the alienation of land and fragmentation of territory
have been acute.
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Introduction: “A shattered, scattered space of exception”?
The paradigm of an explicitly “colonial present” (Gregory 2004) remains prominent
within settler colonial societies and colonial occupations that continue to chip away the
edges of supposedly smooth “post-colonial” temporal and territorial parameters. The
dynamics in Palestine/Israel today entail ongoing conquest, militarised hegemony and
exploitation of resources by the Israeli state, in the context of racialised discourse and
ordering. They also entail civilian settlement and plantation of occupied territory, and the
imposition of direct political and legal institutional administration. While the ideological,
legal and technological parallels between Israel’s state security policies and the post-2001
“international state of emergency” (Jayasuriya 2008) are pronounced, Israel’s relationship
with the Palestinians remains distinct, evoking coloniser-colonised dynamics that are
planted firmly in a struggle for control of the land. The categories and framings that were
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widely presented as new on the international plane after 2001 have long resided in Israel’s
legal landscape. The settler colonial and colonising Israeli state has, indeed, operated in a
self-declared state of emergency since the first week of its formal existence in May 1948,
spawning a complex matrix of emergency modalities that continues to burgeon. This is an
emergency very much marked by both its longevity and its racialised anatomy. Palestine
remains subject to colonial technologies of surveillance and securitisation that demarcate
the colonised and the coloniser.
Israel’s displacement of Palestine’s people and violation of its places and spaces has, for
Derek Gregory (2004, 136), splintered it into “a scattered, shattered space of the excep-
tion.” I present this “shattered space” as a space heavily populated by law, however, rather
than the legal vacuum that the idea of exception evokes for some. In the construction of a
supposedly exceptional nomos in Palestine, law remains integral. It has spun a thick web
of emergency powers, regulations, statutes, military orders and courts that continues to
fan out. Every micro aspect of Palestinian life is enveloped by the suffocating hold of
racialised emergency management. The emergency does not produce something novel or
exceptional, but rather reproduces colonial nodes of governance through a proliferation
of law and legal stratification.
At the same time, the image of a spatial zone at the bounds of law (most clearly mani-
fested through the discharge of mechanised violence against the Gaza Strip) that Gregory’s
framing of exception evokes is apposite to aspects of Israel’s relationship with the Palesti-
nians. It is notable that Israel’s representatives and apologists present the state as simulta-
neously normal and exceptional: a “normal” western liberal democracy, but one which is
subject to unique threats to its state security. Critical analysis of Israel can mirror this
imagery of parallel exemplarity and exceptionality from a different vantage point: Israel is
in one sense exceptional as a state in which racialised privilege is legally encoded in a
manner that undercuts democracy; in another sense it is an archetypal enactment of set-
tler colonialism. This dyadic structure shapes “the oscillating relation between norm and
exception that [in turn] constitutes the paradoxes of the Israeli-Palestinian relation”
(Lloyd 2012, 60). Inherent in Israel’s exemplary coloniality is the idea that racialised emer-
gency rule is itself exemplary of settler colonialism.
This article examines the relation between emergency legal doctrine and racial sover-
eignty in the context of Palestine. It theorises Israel’s multifarious emergency modalities in
a colonial present paradigm where traditional territorial colonisation is fused with modern
security biopolitics. The function of emergency law in the imposition and maintenance of
sovereignty links Israeli practice vis-a-vis the Palestinians with other colonial encounters.
The Israeli juridical-security apparatus mimics European liberal legalism in presenting itself
as generally accepting of human rights obligations, save in circumstances where particular
illiberal measures are necessitated on security grounds. These measures, however, comprise
a pervasive patchwork of emergency modalities that has penetrated all spheres of Palesti-
nian political, economic and cultural life. The consequences for lives and bodies have been
severe; the alienation of land and fragmentation of territory have been acute.
The law in these parts: settlement, sovereignty, emergency
I articulate the dynamics of legality, emergency and sovereignty in Palestine/Israel as
repressive inclusion. This framing suggests – perhaps in subtle contrast to usages of
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“inclusive exclusion”1 – a process whereby Palestinians are included within the Israeli
juridical order but in a manner in which they are legally differentiated and discriminated
against. They are denied the privileges afforded to Jewish nationals, while Israel’s policies
of segregation and apartheid are given institutional and legal grounding (Dugard and Rey-
nolds 2013). The “provision” of law by Israel’s civil authorities, and the extensive use of
legal discourse and institutions – even if in decisionistic form – by the military authorities,
speak to a form of inclusion. Here, the net effect is that of a discriminating and repressive
inclusion; one that is racially contingent. This conceptualisation evokes the suffocating
hold of racialised emergency legal structures on Palestinian life, and provides a fuller
explanation than that of exclusion. It also applies (in different ways through different legal
statuses and techniques, but with a common logic) to Palestinian citizens of Israel as well
as to Palestinians living under occupation in the West Bank and Gaza. Intermittent crises
and moments of exception are bridged and transcended by mundane everyday legal tech-
niques of control and oppression.
Emergency modalities are central to this slow violence of the law. Amidst the array of
emergency decrees promulgated by Israel’s executive, legislature and military, the Palesti-
nian space emerges as a realm saturated by legal regulation. It is necessary, then, in the
Palestinian case as much as broader colonial contexts, to explore the extent to which the
state of emergency and related mechanisms are pivotal to the construction of a juridical
order that itself inscribes conquest, occupation and settlement. The routine, everydayness
of the violence – physical, psychological and administrative – of segregation and occupa-
tion reveals “the banality of the colonial present” (Gregory 2004, 16). The filtering of this
violence through (normalised colonial emergency) law aims to legitimise its performance
for both external and internal audiences. Israeli actions are justified in regulations, stat-
utes, commissions of inquiry and judgments. International lawyers may argue as to
whether those actions and legal regimes actually uphold the “rule of law,” comply with
the strictures of the Geneva Conventions, or are permissible derogations from interna-
tional human rights covenants, but they remain within the space of a juridical order.
In many ways, law is itself the connective tissue binding the twin colonial logic of fear
and dispossession that haunts the Palestinian national and social condition. Law and legal
narratives are indeed central to the story of the colonisation of Palestine. Early Zionist set-
tlement was facilitated by particular instruments of international law. This settlement then
became the basis for the assertion of sovereignty through the establishment of the Israeli
state and, subsequently, that state’s annexationist policies in the West Bank – most nota-
bly and legalistically in respect of East Jerusalem. To preserve this expanding sovereignty,
the international legal doctrine of self-defence has routinely been invoked by Israel.2 Con-
quest, that is, by self-defence. Emergency laws and powers are intimately connected to
this offensive defence. Emergency doctrine is an integral weapon in the arsenal with which
occupation is waged. It is instrumentalised to foment and sustain fear so as to underwrite
the measured tightening of the grip on Palestinian land, movement and thought. Settler
colonial policy in Israel is, as it has been elsewhere, performed through law.
The settler colonial analytic is, as Brenna Bhandar and Rafeef Ziadah (2016) put it, “an
essential lens to understand the myriad forms of dispossession experienced by Palesti-
nians from the late nineteenth century,” and one that allows us to historicize the coloniza-
tion of Palestine as a process that began long before 1948.3 Jewish migration to Palestine,
as it began on a collective scale in the early 1880s following the establishment of the first
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colony in 1878, was quickly followed by the escalation of Zionist discourse aimed at the
creating the ideological framework of a Jewish state in Palestine. By the time of the “Sec-
ond Aliyah” of 1904–1914, it was clearly constituted as a settler colonial movement whose
constituents sought no part in the existing polity in Palestine, but rather aimed to establish
their own sovereignty (see, e.g. Shafir 1989). In the idiom of Zionist ideology, the term
“settlement” (yishuv) carries a powerful resonance. Its roots lie in the phrase Yishuv Eretz
Yisrael (“settlement of the land of Israel”), and the pre-state Jewish community in Pales-
tine is still referred to in Hebrew as the Yishuv. For the Zionist movement, settlement is
inextricably linked to the procurement of sovereignty, an essential precursor to the attain-
ment of statehood and title to territory. This epitomises settler colonial ideology, and illu-
minates the rationale underpinning Israel’s ongoing “settlement” of the West Bank.
While anchored by certain cardinal features, every colonial encounter and every settler
colonial process has its own defining idiosyncrasies. Zionist settler colonialism is some-
what distinct in that in did not have one specific “mother” nation-state in Europe from
which the settler population and other forms of logistical and political support were
drawn. It was based, instead, on the “more diffuse but no less potent ’Western civilization’
of which Zionism has believed itself representative since the earliest days of the colonisa-
tion of Palestine” (Lloyd 2012, 68). In the context of the Balfour Declaration and the
League of Nations Mandate for Palestine, settler sovereignty developed under the protec-
tive guard of British administration. The emergence of the Israeli state from that embry-
onic sanctuary was a markedly less anti-colonial moment than other decolonisations
throughout Africa and Asia that came soon afterwards.
Instead, a spiral of colonialisms curls through the Israeli self-determination project,
connecting early Zionist settlement with British colonial foreign policy, the League of
Nations Mandate, the role of the United Nations in legitimising Zionist claims to sover-
eignty via settlement (in the 1947 partition plan and subsequent recognition of Israel’s
independence), and Israel’s continued colonisation of the West Bank today. These con-
nections are woven deep into the fabric of political and legal discourse in Palestine, and
suggest that international law and institutions, far from remaining above the political
fray, are profoundly compromised by their engagement in the whole affair. Palestine
emerges as a victim of the coloniality in which international law’s heritage is rooted. We
can identify a “train of legal instruments which sweeps through the last century from the
Balfour Declaration onwards through the League of Nations Mandate, the UK’s Order-in-
Council, the United Nations Partition Resolution, Security Council Resolution 242, the
Oslo Agreements and the Quartet Road Map” to demonstrate that international law “has
constructed the Palestinians as peripheral,” and that “[l]aw has played a major role in
pushing Palestine and the Palestinians to the political and territorial margins” (Strawson
2005, 2).
The language of the early twentieth century international legal instruments – the “Jew-
ish national home” promised in the Balfour Declaration; the commitments made in the
League of Nations Mandate to “facilitate Jewish immigration” and “encourage, in cooper-
ation with the Jewish Agency … close settlement by Jews of the land”; the reduction in
that same text of Palestine’s 90% Arab majority to “other sections of the population” and
“existing non-Jewish communities” – set the tone for the marginalisation of the Palesti-
nians. The elision of Palestinian identity by the League of Nations and the British Man-
date in particular contributed to the fostering of conditions in which the dispossession of
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Palestinian land would occur.4 From a pre-Mandate articulation of the “determination of
the Jewish people to live with the Arab people on terms of unity and mutual respect and
together with them to make a common home into a flourishing community,”5 Zionism
was able to evolve into an increasingly exclusionary form of Jewish nationalism under the
British protectorate. Zionist settlement in Palestine proliferated during the League of
Nations era, with the Jewish population rising from 80,000 in 1917 to 390,000 in 1939;
“the context of the Mandate created the framework in which Jewish political and legal
identity developed. It was the Mandate that gave Jews the first quasi-national political
institution with legal powers – the Jewish Agency” (Strawson 2002, 376), which would
subsequently form the nucleus of the Israeli state.6 The UN’s 1947 partition plan and rec-
ognition of Israeli sovereignty amounted to a legitimation of settler colonial policy and an
acceptance of the idea that the territory of Mandate Palestine was legally disputed.
Since then, international law has shown itself sufficiently indeterminate7 to have been
harnessed and sculpted by Israel’s military legal advisors and Supreme Court judges. Law
is invoked in Israel to endorse colonial policies and, among other things: to deny the exis-
tence of any sovereign claims to the West Bank and Gaza concomitant or subsequent to
their status as British colonial territory and prior to their colonisation by Israel; to discard
the “non-humanitarian aspects” of humanitarian law; to afford privileges and protections
to settlers; to justify the construction of the Wall and its associated colonising infrastruc-
ture in the West Bank; to sanction targeted killing policies (see, e.g. Gunneflo 2016); to
legislatively categorise Palestinian fighters as “unlawful combatants” and deprive them of
the protections afforded to either civilians or combatants; and to legitimise the siege of
Gaza and the launching of aerial bombardments and ground incursions in “self-defence.”
As has been noted, “the historical record shows that it can be convenient for the hegemon
to have a body of law to work with, provided that it is suitably adapted” (Vagts 2001,
845). The attention paid to both domestic and international law by the Israeli military is
politically significant.
Ra’anan Alexandrowicz’s 2011 documentary on the Israeli legal apparatus as it relates
to the occupied territories, The Law in These Parts, provides lucid insight into the role of
Supreme Court and military court judges in the administration of the occupation, and
into the function of law as an instrument for settler colonial ends. Alexandrowicz presents
“law as an issue of language; its inefficacy and its arbitrariness, its brutality.” It is a lan-
guage that most people do not understand, but also one whose meaning is contingent on
its speaker. In the Israeli-occupied territories, law serves as an alibi for power rather than
a constraint on it, and as such has been emptied of any meaningful relation to concepts of
justice. One particularly revealing passage in the film relates to legal justifications for the
seizure of Palestinian land in the West Bank in pursuit of settlement construction. Former
military judge and legal advisor to the West Bank military command, Alexander Ramat,
recounts how Ariel Sharon (Minister for Agriculture and head of the government’s settle-
ment committee at the time) summonsed the Israeli military lawyers for a meeting within
minutes of the Elon Moreh judgment8 being handed down by the Supreme Court in Octo-
ber 1979. In that case, Palestinian land-owners Azat Muhamed and Mustafa Dweikat had
argued that the military seizure of their (and their neighbours’) privately owned land9 –
occupied in June 1979 by a settler group in an operation directed by Sharon (Weizman
2007, 100) – for the purposes of Israeli civilian settlement had been illegal. Preceding
Supreme Court jurisprudence had upheld similar requisitions of private land as
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permissible under the laws of occupation, on the grounds that the civilian settlements and
infrastructure concerned performed valid and essential military and security functions.10
As Eyal Weizman (2007, 105) explains:
Between 1967 and 1979, on the basis of the exceptions of “temporariness” and “security” the
government issued dozens of orders for the requisition of private land in the West Bank.
When called upon to do so, the government and the military demonstrated their claim for
the pressing security needs by inviting expert witnesses, usually high-ranking military officers
or the Chief of Staff himself, to testify that a particular settlement dominated a major artery,
or another strategic location, that it could participate in the general effort of “regional
defence”, or in the supervision and control of a hostile population. As long as this claim was
maintained, the High Court of Justice rejected all petitions of Palestinian landowners and
accepted the government’s interpretation of the term “temporary military necessity”.
The concepts of temporariness and security are embedded in the idea of the state of emer-
gency, as well as that of occupation. In the Elon Moreh case, such defences against the
claim of unlawful expropriation were less than coherently presented by the state. Then
Israeli military Chief of Staff, Refael Eitan, couched the necessity of the settlement in
terms of “regional defence” in the hypothetical event of an inter-state war in the region,
rather than any specific or immediate security threats within the West Bank. At the same
time, the Gush Emunim movement involved in settling the land around Dweikat’s village
of Rujeib – supported by elements of the Likud government that had come to power in
1977 – was unreserved about the permanence of their intentions. They made no claims to
the settlement serving mere temporary or security purposes. One of the settlers, Menac-
hem Felix, made the point clear in his testimony to the Court:
Basing the requisition orders on security grounds in their narrow, technical meaning rather
than their basic and comprehensive meaning as explained above can be construed only in
one way: the settlement is temporary and replaceable. We reject this frightening conclusion
outright. It is also inconsistent with the government’s decision on our settling on this site. In
all our contacts and from the many promises we received from government ministers, and
most importantly from the prime minister himself ¡ and the said seizure order was issued in
accordance with the personal intervention of the prime minister ¡ all see Elon Moreh to be
a permanent Jewish settlement no less than Deganya or Netanya.11
Presented with such overtly contradictory positions to the discourse of “temporary” secu-
rity needs, the Supreme Court ordered the authorities to return the land in Rujeib to its
owners, prompting Sharon to immediately set about devising an alternative legal premise
for the project of seizing and settling Palestinian land.12 At the meeting called by Sharon
in the wake of the judgment, Ramat offered the idea of reviving the concept of mawat
land (“dead” or “unused” land) from nineteenth century Ottoman agrarian land law.
According to this doctrine, land lying a certain distance outside a given village, even if
belonging to someone, is only owned temporarily as long as that owner cultivates it. If it
is not cultivated for three consecutive years, it is considered “dead land” belonging to no
one, and reverts to the empire.13 Satisfied that this could serve the settlement project’s
purpose, Sharon gathered a team of lawyers and geographers and set about identifying,
mapping and registering uncultivated land using aerial photometry. Elon Moreh was
established on an alternative site on this basis, and throughout the West Bank swathes of
land were declared state land by the regional military command. A number of techniques
were then constructed around this policy, such as the reduction of water quotas to
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Palestinian farmers to curtail their capacity to cultivate land.14 The expropriation through
re-categorisation was upheld by the Supreme Court, and the scale and pace of settlement
construction escalated from the late 1970s. As Weizman (2007, 108) notes, therefore:
Although the liberal press celebrated the Elon Moreh ruling as a victory over the Likud gov-
ernment, it later became clear that this ruling was nothing but a Pyrrhic victory. Not only
was Elon Moreh established on an alternative site; indeed, for whoever wished to read it, the
ruling’s wording itself indicated alternative methods of access to land. The court confirmed
that future access to land in the Occupied Territories for the construction of settlements
would be permitted on public land entrusted to the custodianship of the military power, and
added that if the state adheres to this principle, the court would no longer interfere in its
future settlement efforts.
The Supreme Court did this through accepting the seizure of huge quantities of state land,
including private Palestinian land recast as state land,15 as well as by holding that the
legality of the settlements themselves was a “political” question and as such not justiciable
before the courts.16 Former Chief Justice Meir Shamgar claims that the developments ini-
tiated by the Israeli military legal professionals and the decisions taken by the Supreme
Court had no bearing on the manner in which Israel’s land and settlement policies pro-
ceeded in the occupied territories, arguing there was “no indication that the steps taken
by the Court are connected to this phenomenon.… This is a political phenomenon, not
connected to the Court.”17 Alexandrowicz plainly exposes this constructed law/politics
binary as a false and implausible separation.
Law was very much part of the political discourse and dynamic of settlement. The
“dead land” concept finds obvious analogy in the common law doctrine of terra nullius,
used to great effect in the colonisation of Australia and North America through the acqui-
sition of land marked not by emptiness per se, but by an absence of “civilised” society
capable of exercising sovereignty. It also evokes a liberal imperial theory of property
rights, which justified the non-consensual nature of colonial dominion and the disposses-
sion of indigenous peoples who were not cultivating the land in question. Settlers who did
mix their labour with the land to improve it gained rights to the land. Once such rights
had been established, any native attempts to regain the land could be put down with force.
As Alexandrowicz’s narration highlights, with Israel’s military occupation now succeeding
Ottoman and British rule, “what the IDF [Israeli military] says goes … the regional com-
mander is now the empire.” This conjures up a distinctly Lockean understanding of sover-
eign prerogative.
Within the broader legal discourse in Israel, the direct and concrete legacy of British
colonial emergency measures occupies a central position. Israel remains in a perpetual
state of national emergency and continues to apply the British Defence (Emergency) Reg-
ulations 1945 as part of the legal basis for policy as it relates to the Palestinians. In the
construction of a supposedly exceptional nomos in Palestine, law remains pivotal. The
state of emergency serves to frame the situation for both domestic and international con-
sumption as one of defensive security rather than aggressive conquest. The deeper reality
of institutionalised domination based on ethno-national lines, however, reinforces the
notion of racialisation as a prominent component of the invocation of sovereign emer-
gency power. As has typically been the case in colonial spaces, emergency powers are nec-
essary to the preservation of sovereignty, serving as a bridge between the twinned pillars
of liberal empire: conquest by force, and rule of law. The line connecting settlement and
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emergency powers can also be mapped. Settlement and cultivation act, for Zionism, as a
precursor to the establishment of sovereignty. Emergency powers are subsequently dis-
charged as an element of that acquired sovereignty in order to consolidate its supremacy
over any competing claims. A plethora of emergency legal mechanisms converge to
inscribe a form of control over the body, mind and territory of the colonised, and to sup-
press resistance to such control.
Israel’s emergency modalities
The Mandate-era Defence (Emergency) Regulations constitute one element of Israel’s
broader, multifarious emergency legal regime. Within a region noted for prolonged use of
emergency law as a governmental structure of authoritarian rule,18 Israel stands out as an
exemplar of permanent emergency. In addition to the retention of the British emergency
regulations, a state of emergency was proclaimed by the Provisional State Council on 19
May 1948 – in the first few days of the state’s existence – and has persisted without inter-
ruption since then. This enables the executive branch to alter or suspend laws passed by
the legislature. Some but not all elements of Israel’s emergency modalities are dependent
on this declared emergency. The Israeli legal system includes several mechanisms of emer-
gency law that overlap, but exist independently of each other. The emergency jurispru-
dential situation is dense to the point of being described as “incoherent” and
“convoluted” (Mehozay 2012, 137–138). Contrary to conceptions of this situation as the
inadvertent accumulation of necessary threat-specific responses enacted at particular
points in time, however, it is more revealingly understood as a concerted tool of gover-
nance whose structural ambiguity offers a convenient flexibility.
Emergency modalities in the Israeli legal order assume three principal legal forms. The
Defence (Emergency) Regulations, as noted, remain on the law books of the land long
after the departure of their original British authors. While framed in the lineage of colo-
nial emergency doctrine, their subsequent application by Israel is not tied to the declara-
tion of a state of emergency.19 Israel has itself constructed two further bases in law for
extraordinary measures. Specific administrative emergency orders or regulations can be
promulgated by the executive branch of government, and are dependent upon a declared
state of emergency. Primary emergency legislation enacted by the Knesset (Israel’s parlia-
ment) can similarly be made contingent on the existence of a declared emergency, but
may alternatively be worded to apply independently (Mehozay 2012, 140–141).
The defence (emergency) regulations
The Defence (Emergency) Regulations 1945 was the last version of the emergency code
deployed by Britain in its administration of Palestine. It followed on from previous instru-
ments that had been used suppress Arab revolt against foreign rule from the early 1930s:
the Palestine (Defence) Order in Council 1931; the Palestine Martial Law (Defence) Order
in Council 1936; the Emergency Regulations 1936; the Palestine (Defence) Order in
Council 1937; the Defence (Military Courts) Regulation 1937; the Defence (Military
Commanders) Regulations 1938; and the Defence Regulations 1939. Such texts had,
between them, offered the typical panoply of emergency powers – censorship, curfew, clo-
sure, house demolition, movement restriction, detention without trial, deportation and
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land requisition – to the executive and military authorities. The Defence (Emergency)
Regulations 1945 integrated much of what had been included in these instruments in a
consolidated and more comprehensive form. The Regulations were used against both Pal-
estinian Arabs and Jews in the post-war years before Britain abdicated its Mandate. They
were condemned by Zionist leaders of the time as undemocratic and racist laws, to the
point of being compared unfavourably to Nazi occupation standards.20
Following the establishment of the Israeli state, the Defence (Emergency) Regulations
were adopted by Israel under Section 11 of the Law and Administration Ordinance 1948
(the first piece of legislation enacted by Israel’s Provisional State Council).21 Proposals for
the revocation of the Regulations (or their replacement by permanent legislation) were
made in the Knesset in 1949, and on a number of occasions in the 1950s. Criticism voiced
by Jewish-Israeli judges, legislators and religious figures routinely characterised the regula-
tions as fascist and authoritarian. The context of this opposition was a small number of
high-profile cases of administrative detention of members of Zionist paramilitary groups.
In a 1951 Knesset debate over whether the provisions of the Regulations providing for
detention without trial ought to be extirpated from the Israeli legal system, then opposi-
tion leader Menachem Begin challenged Foreign Minister (and, at the time, acting Prime
Minister) Moshe Sharett’s defence of administrative detention and his contention that
“law is law”:
Not so! There are tyrannical laws, there are unethical laws… And an unethical law is also an
illegal law. The detention is therefore illegal, and your order is arbitrary.22
Notably, however, the Regulations had also emerged by 1950 as the legal basis for the sys-
tem of military government imposed on the predominantly Palestinian Arab regions
within Israel. As the threat of Jewish attacks against the state dissipated, the racialisation
of the Regulations intensified through their use against Palestinian citizens of Israel. By
the end of 1948, the main Arab population centres inside what had materialised as Israel’s
de facto borders – most of which had been mapped outside of Israel’s borders in the UN
partition plan – were effectively under military rule. Five military governorates were cre-
ated: Jaffa, Ramle-Lod, Nazareth, the Western Galilee, and the Negev. Throughout 1949,
these areas were classified as occupied territories, before an integrated system of military
government was established in 1950 under the direction and coordination of the Ministry
of Defence. This form of military rule of the Palestinians within Israel continued until
1966, with the Defence (Emergency) Regulations as its primary legal framework. As such,
a territorial zone of emergency was carved out within Israel in a racially contingent man-
ner, based on the demographic make-up of the region concerned. For Edward Said (1979,
36, 105), the implications were clear:
These laws were openly racist in that they were never used in Israel against Jews. When Israel
retained them after 1948 for use in controlling the Arab minority, they forbade Arabs the
right of movement, the right of purchase of land, the right of settlement, and so forth. Under
the mandate the regulations were regularly denounced by the Jews as colonial and racist. Yet
as soon as Israel became a state, those same laws were used against the Arabs.… Until 1966,
the Arab citizens of Israel were ruled by a military government exclusively in existence to
control, bend, manipulate, terrorize, tamper with every facet of Arab life from birth virtually
to death.
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Israeli scholars acknowledge that the regulations were used almost exclusively against
Arabs (Kretzmer 1990, 116, 128), and at the time the state comptroller held there to be
“something improper” about a law like this being enforced against one particular group of
the population.23 Said (1979, 103) asserts that the purpose underlying the application of
stringent emergency powers was “to pay that wretched [Palestinian population] for its
temerity in staying where it did not belong,” seeing it as entwined with the “Judaisation”
of those parts of Israel that retained an Arab majority. The discourse of Israeli leaders dur-
ing this period offers little to dispute that claim, with a racialised vision of the state very
much to the fore. David Ben-Gurion’s 1960 speech to the World Zionist Congress is a
case in point, eliding the binational character of the country’s population:
In Israel there are not two spheres.… Here everybody is both Jewish and universal: the soil
we walk upon, the trees whose fruit we eat, the roads on which we travel, the houses we live
in, the factories where we work, the schools where our children are educated, the army in
which they are trained, the ships we sail in and the planes in which we fly, the language we
speak and the air we breath, the landscape we see and the vegetation that surrounds us—all
of it is Jewish.24
While military rule and the Defence (Emergency) Regulations are most commonly associ-
ated with the security provisions mandating restrictions on liberty through powers of
arrest, detention and curfew, other aspects of the Regulations that have had a more pro-
found structural impact on relations with the Palestinians. Ben-Gurion was frank about
the primary function of the internal military government over Israel’s Palestinian popula-
tion: “the military regime came into existence to protect the right of Jewish settlement in
all parts of the state.”25 The Defence (Emergency) Regulations were central to land and
planning policies in Israel’s formative years, underpinning an ideology of pioneering set-
tlement that was as central within the new state as it had been in Mandate Palestine and
would be in the post-1967 occupied territories. The regulations were used to expropriate
large parcels of Palestinian land inside Israel through the creation of “closed” security
zones. Under Regulation 125:
A Military Commander may by order declare any area or place to be a closed area for the
purposes of these Regulations. Any person who, during any period in which any such order
is in force in relation to any area or place, enters or leaves that area or place without a permit
in writing issued by or on behalf of the Military Commander shall be guilty of an offense
against these Regulations.26
From 1948, all of the Arab-Palestinian villages and towns in Israel, whether still inhabited
or not, were declared by the military authorities as separate closed areas. This encom-
passed approximately 85% of the Palestinians on the Israeli side of the armistice line, with
only those living in predominantly Jewish urban areas not directly affected (Quigley 2005,
106). Large tracts of land were closed by the military, with their inhabitants expelled or
their owners denied access, and the land in turn confiscated by the state. Under Regula-
tion 125, Palestinians were prevented from leaving their own village or town without a
permit from the Israeli military authorities, even for the purposes of cultivating and har-
vesting their own lands, or of travelling to market towns to sell their produce. The Galilee
area alone was divided into fifty-eight sectors for travel permit purposes. Applying for
permits was a burdensome process, with requests often rejected. Palestinians residing or
travelling without a permit – or with an expired permit, or a permit for a different route –
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were summarily fined or imprisoned, with recourse only to military courts. The Regula-
tions thus operated to prevent Palestinian farmers from accessing and cultivating their
own land. In a similar fashion to later developments in the occupied territories, the Minis-
ter of Agriculture was in turn mandated to classify closed-off Palestinian land as “unculti-
vated” and thus unprotected from expropriation (Nakkara 1985, 15–16). In his time as
Director-General of Israel’s Ministry of Defence, Shimon Peres (1962) made it clear that
the fundamental value of the Defence (Emergency) Regulations was rooted not in imme-
diate security concerns, but in facilitating Zionism’s overarching goals: “By making use of
Article 125, on which the Military Government is to a great extent based, we can directly
continue the struggle for Jewish settlement and Jewish immigration.” Regulation 125 was
used in tandem with other mechanisms developed in the state’s legal apparatus for the
purposes of expropriating and acquiring Palestinian land, including the Abandoned Areas
Ordinance 1948 and the Land Acquisition (Validation of Acts and Compensation) Law
1953.
Dispossession of Palestinians under this emergency infrastructure was sustained even
where it was not condoned by the Israeli Supreme Court. Don Peretz (1991, 90) chronicles
one example relating to the Arab-Palestinian population of the northern border village of
Iqrit:
After surrendering to the [Israeli military] on 31 October 1948, the villagers were asked to
leave for fifteen days because of “security reasons.” Most left with only enough personal
belongings for two weeks, but five years later the army still gave no indication that it would
permit them to return. When the case was brought to the High Court of Justice in 1953, the
court did not dispute the army’s right to evacuate a population in times of emergency. How-
ever, questioning the procedures followed to prevent the return of the villagers after termina-
tion of the emergency, it ordered the army to permit the inhabitants to go home. The [Israeli
military] responded by destroying most of the village and refusing to obey the court.
The Defence (Emergency) Regulations were used to extend the closure order in 1963 and
again in 1972. Iqrit’s expelled villagers went back to the Supreme Court with another peti-
tion in 1981, where it was this time held that their continued displacement was justified.27
The displaced Palestinians continued their campaign to return to their village. A Ministe-
rial Committee appointed in 1993 found that there was no security imperative for the
ongoing expulsion of those evacuated in 1948, and recommended a “compromise” solu-
tion whereby approximately 10% of their original land would be restored to the villagers,
on which each family would be entitled to build one house. In 2001, however, the Israeli
cabinet issued a decision asserting that the same security concerns which had informed
the 1972 closure under the Defence (Emergency) Regulations remained relevant, and the
villagers were therefore prevented from returning. The Supreme Court deferred to this
position and proposed that compensation be paid instead, a solution that was unaccept-
able to the displaced residents (Abu Hussein and McKay 2003, 85).
As the Iqrit case demonstrates, the Defence (Emergency) Regulations were retained
inside Israel after the dissolution of military rule in 1966 and the transfer of government
functions in the country’s Arab areas to the state’s civil authorities. Since then, the Regula-
tions have continued to be used inside Israel, particularly in relation to land issues arising
in border areas. Provisions of the Defence (Emergency) Regulations providing for the
banning of “unlawful associations” (Regulations 84 and 85) and censorship (Regulations
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86–101) have been invoked in recent years to close Arabic-language newspapers, to ban
Palestinian political parties and associations, and to disqualify their candidates from
Knesset elections.28
The use of the Defence (Emergency) Regulations inside Israel was most pronounced,
however, during the crucial period of military rule up to 1966, as the state went about con-
solidating its demographic and territorial dominance. As Said (1979, 106) reminds us,
“the best introduction to what has been taking place in the Occupied Territories is the tes-
timony of Israeli Arabs who suffered through Israeli legal brutality before 1967.”29 The
legal tools were certainly carried across, with the Defence (Emergency) Regulations
assuming a significant role in the legal architecture of the occupation. The racialised use
of the Regulations continues to this day in the occupied territories through almost exclu-
sive application to Palestinian residents. They provide the basis for a profusion of military
orders covering administrative detention, home demolition, land seizure, curfew, deporta-
tion, and censorship. Defenders of Israeli security policy in this regard argue that the dis-
criminatory application of the emergency regulations is between Israelis and non-Israelis
purely on grounds of citizenship, not between Jewish-Israeli settlers and Arab-Palestinians
on grounds of national or ethnic origin. Israel’s prior targeted application of the emer-
gency regulations towards its Arab citizens in the internal military government period,
however, undermines this claim. The Defence (Emergency) Regulations have now been
retained in the Israeli legal system for seven decades, playing on the licence granted by a
supposed temporariness, but deeply entangled with the state’s brand of racial sovereignty.
Emergency measures under the declared state of emergency
Pursuant to Section 9 of the Law and Administration Ordinance 1948, Israel was ushered
into a declared and temporally indeterminate state of emergency from the first week of
the state’s formal existence. After more than forty years of the emergency as status quo,
the governing legal framework was given a slight procedural makeover, with the authority
to declare an emergency reconstituted in the 1992 Basic Law: Government,30 and sub-
jected to a condition that the declaration “may not exceed one year.” With the Basic Law
proceeding to allow for unlimited renewals by parliament, however, the temporality of the
emergency in effect remained indefinite. The Knesset has renewed the state of emergency
every year thereafter without fail, meaning that Israel’s national emergency has continued
since May 1948 without respite.
A number of mechanisms are triggered by a declared state of emergency. The govern-
ment is authorised to enact discrete administrative emergency regulations to circumvent
“normal” constitutional guarantees. As such, while the legislature is responsible for declar-
ing and renewing (normalising) the state of emergency, the executive has full discretion as
to the nature of exceptional measures to be taken: “During a declared state of emergency,
the government, and in urgent cases the Prime Minister alone, is authorized to enact
emergency regulations for the defense of the state, public security, and the maintenance
of supplies and essential services.” Emergency regulations propagated under this authority
can and do take supremacy over ordinary parliamentary legislation, prompting human
rights organisations to decry the fact that bestowing such a mandate to the executive
serves to “violate the principles of the rule of law and the separation of powers.”31 Execu-
tive emergency regulations have been imposed consistently from 1948. Many of them
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have supplemented Israel’s land appropriation mechanisms under the Defence (Emer-
gency) Regulations.
The Emergency Regulations (Absentees’ Property) Law 1948 marks the genesis of Isra-
el’s “absentee property” doctrine. Under this doctrine, the land of an individual deemed
an “absentee” can be confiscated by the state. This concept was moulded for the confisca-
tion of property belonging to Palestinians that had been killed or forced to flee to neigh-
bouring countries in 1948, but was applied even if, as “in many cases, the absentees were
present – a legal fiction of Kafkaesque subtlety” (Said 1979, 105). Internally displaced Pal-
estinians who were barred from returning to their homes, although still in Israel, were
constructed as “present absentees.” Significantly, in terms of racialisation, even if Jewish
individuals could have ostensibly fallen within the definition (Kretzmer 1990, 102, 115),
the Absentee Property doctrine has been implemented only against Arabs. An “absentee”
is defined as any person owning land in Israel who is a citizen, national or resident of Leb-
anon, Egypt, Syria, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Iraq, Yemen, the West Bank or Gaza, or who was
a citizen of British Palestine but left the area that became Israel in 1948. These particular
emergency regulations set the tone for the permanent legislation that superseded them in
the form of the Absentees’ Property Law 1950. Beyond the particular case of the “absent”
Palestinian population – whether refugees outside the Green Line or internally displaced
within – substantial tracts of land still remained in the possession of Palestinians who
managed to stay and become citizens in Israel. The Israeli authorities thus devised addi-
tional emergency regulations aimed at accumulating further land. As early as the summer
of 1948, a series of emergency orders were introduced to underwrite large-scale land
transfers on purported state security grounds (Cohen and Cohen 2011, 56). The Emer-
gency Regulations (Requisition of Property) Law 1948, for instance, was promulgated by
decree to allow the provisional government to seize property. This was replaced and
cemented by legislation enacted by the Knesset the following year. Significantly, the Emer-
gency Land Requisition (Regulation) Law 1949 authorises land and housing requisition
orders by the Israeli authorities not only for “the defense of the State, public security, the
maintenance of essential supplies or essential public services” but also to facilitate “the
absorption of immigrants or the rehabilitation of ex-soldiers or war invalids.”32 As such,
the legislation’s thrust transcends security and defence necessities, and is explicitly linked
to immigration and citizenship policies aimed at consolidating settler colonial domina-
tion. It is also important to note that land seizure under these orders was initially defined
as a temporary requisition subject to certain time limitations which were eliminated in
subsequent amendments, “effectively transforming the initial requisition into permanent
expropriation” (Bisharat 1994, 517).
In a similar vein, a series of instruments relating to “waste” land put in train a process
whereby Israel’s Minister of Agriculture could assume control of “uncultivated” Palesti-
nian land. This originated in the Emergency Regulations (Cultivation of Waste Lands)
1948, which was amended by the Emergency Regulations (Cultivation of Waste Lands)
(Extension of Validity) Ordinance 1949 and the Emergency Regulations (Cultivation of
Waste [Uncultivated] Lands) Law 1949, culminating in the Emergency Regulations (Cul-
tivation of Waste Lands) Law 1951. In addition to being empowered to confiscate unculti-
vated land, the Minister of Agriculture is also mandated to assume control “of water
resources and water installations which in his opinion are not sufficiently utilised.”33
These measures have typically been used in conjunction with the Defence (Emergency)
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Regulations, whereby areas closed by the military authorities are subsequently confiscated
by the Minister of Agriculture on the basis that they are no longer being cultivated.34
The Emergency Regulations (Security Zones) Law 1949 gives the Minister of Defence
discretion to categorise areas (within ten kilometres of Israel’s northern borders, and
twenty-five kilometres of the borders in the south) as security zones that must be evacu-
ated. This policy has been applied particularly in the Galilee region, the areas towards the
Lebanese and Syrian borders, and around the Gaza Strip. Land acquired under this order
has typically been sold or transferred to the Jewish National Fund, a para-state institution
mandated to “acquire and develop lands in Palestine for the exclusive benefit of the Jewish
people” (Dajani 2005, 18). Such measures, framed in a security discourse, function to feed
into the deeper structural and demographic aspects of Israel’s land policies.
The extensive grid of related emergency laws and regulations that are used in par-
allel and in mutually reinforcing ways is indicative of the state of emergency para-
digm as a surface upon which settler colonial policies were legally inscribed from the
outset in Israel. The torrent of emergency measures enacted for the purposes of land
expropriation so soon after the state’s foundation implies a degree of premeditation,
and a continuity of pre-state Zionist policies and plans aimed at the conquest of Pal-
estinian land.35 To insulate that conquest, and Jewish-Israeli domination of state
institutions, a range of emergency mechanisms also operate to obstruct Palestinian
participation in the political and social life of Israel and the region. The Emergency
Regulations (Foreign Travel) 1948 [an instrument authorising the Minister of Interior
to prevent Israeli citizens from travelling abroad “as he sees fit,” and on the basis of
secret evidence] and the Prevention of Infiltration (Offences and Jurisdiction) Law
1954 [an emergency law prohibiting travel, or assistance others in travelling, to a
number of Arab states designated as “enemy states”] continue to be used to prose-
cute or impose travel bans on Palestinians. In 2002, for example, Palestinian member
of the Knesset Azmi Bishara was indicted under these laws for helping Palestinian
citizens of Israel to visit relatives in Syria. While his case was pending, the Knesset
passed Amendment 7 to the Emergency Regulations (Foreign Travel) 1948, to
remove diplomatic travel immunity from parliament members. From 2002, similarly,
Sheikh Ra’ed Salah, a Muslim Palestinian religious leader in Israel, was prevented
from travelling for annual pilgrimage by an emergency travel ban order issued by
the Minister of Interior and upheld on security grounds by the Supreme Court.36
Although ostensibly tied to national security matters, Israel’s emergency legal regime
infiltrates a diversity of areas, often, as noted, without any discernible connection to per-
ceived threats to the existence or security of the state. In addition to underwriting land
expropriation and colonisation processes, dozens of sets of emergency regulations have
been enacted in spheres spanning economic regulation, labour relations, shipping practi-
ces, civil registration, fire-fighting, trade and monetary issues. It has been noted that emer-
gency regulatory powers under Section 9 of the Law and Administration Ordinance 1948
have been invoked, for instance, in “an almost routine fashion” since the Yom Kippur war
in 1973 to bypass burdensome industrial dispute resolution processes “in situations where
no special urgency was present or when other, less drastic means had been available”
(Gross and Nı Aolain 2006, 232–233, citing Hofnung 1996, 55–60, and Mironi 1986, 380–
386).
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In addition to executive emergency decrees or regulations, statutory legislation—while
enacted and amended by the Knesset in the same fashion as ordinary statutes – can also
be framed in such a way that applicability is contingent upon the existence of a state of
emergency. The Emergency Powers (Detention) Law 1979, for example, which enables
administrative detention of residents of Israel, residents of territory occupied by Israel,
and residents of other states, was framed so that it “shall only apply in a period in which a
state of emergency exists in the State by virtue of a declaration under Section 9 of the Law
and Administration Ordinance.” This succeeded Regulations 108 and 111 of the Defence
(Emergency) Regulations and grants discretion to the Minister of Defence to issue (and
renew indefinitely) administrative detention orders where he or she “has reasonable cause
to believe that reasons of state security or public security require that a particular person
be detained.” In the context of a perpetually renewed state of emergency, this ordinance
effectively functions as an ordinary piece of permanent legislation, thus normalising the
exceptional powers of detention without trial in the legal system. The fact that (leaving
aside the continuing use of the law against Palestinian citizens of Israel) more than
800,000 Palestinians in the occupied territories – encompassing approximately 40% of the
total male population – have been detained since 1967 under military order is testament
to this normalisation (Addameer 2012, 4).
Such deprivation of liberty en masse is ostensibly inimical to international human
rights and fair trial standards. Upon ratifying the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights in 1991, however, Israel submitted a formal notification stating that (since
1948) its security situation has constituted a public emergency within the meaning of the
Covenant’s derogation provision in Article 4 – that is, an existential “threat to the life of
the nation.” On this basis, Israel declared that it was suspending certain obligations under
the Covenant and derogating from Article 9 (right to liberty).37 While expressing “con-
cern” at Israel’s reliance on the state of emergency in its periodic reviews of the state, the
UN Human Rights Committee points to Israel’s security and accepts that international
law entitles states to derogate at their own discretion.38 As such, international law shows
itself to be implicated in the perpetuation of Israel’s emergency modalities. Characterisa-
tions of Israel’s state of emergency as oppositional to international law thus present a
somewhat simplified and idealised vision of the international legal system – a vision
divorced from the field’s own colonial legacy and its facilitation of emergency powers.
In its first review of Israel in 1998, the Human Rights Committee recommended that
Israel reassess what was by then a fifty-year-old state of emergency “with a view to limit-
ing as far as possible its scope.”39 In its subsequent periodic review in 2003, the Commit-
tee remained concerned about the scope of Israel’s emergency, while “welcoming the
State party’s decision to review the need to maintain the declared state of emergency and
to prolong it on a yearly rather than an indefinite basis.”40 As I have noted above, how-
ever, it had been clear from quite soon after the introduction of this change in the 1990s
that it was essentially a cosmetic procedural reform that allowed for unlimited renewals
and, as such, did not qualitatively affect the emergency’s indefinite status. Israel has
repeatedly told the Committee since this this time that it “has been inclined to refrain
from extending the state of emergency any further [but that] the actual termination of the
state of emergency could not be executed immediately, as certain fundamental laws,
orders and regulations legally depend upon the existence of a state of emergency.”41 In its
2010 and 2014 reviews of Israel, the Committee reiterated its concern at the continuing
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state of emergency and detention without trial of Palestinians, while continuing to
acknowledge at face value “the ongoing legislative process regarding the future cancella-
tion of the state of emergency.”42 Far from taking collective action or imposing sanctions
on Israel, the international community of nations – particularly its Western powers – con-
tinues to covet and purchase the techniques and military technologies by which Israel
maintains its colonial emergency rule (Lloyd 2012, 77).
On the domestic legal register in Israel, judicial challenges to both the Defence (Emer-
gency) Regulations and the declared state of emergency have been brought at various
points since 1948, resulting in the Israeli Supreme Court repeatedly stamping its imprima-
tur on the government and military authorities’ use of emergency doctrine, thereby facili-
tating its normalisation.
“Intent to regularise”: emergency on trial
One of the first cases brought before Israel’s Supreme Court in 1948, arising from a
request for revocation of an administrative detention order under the Defence (Emer-
gency) Regulations 1945, involved a challenge to the validity of the British Regulations
themselves in the nascent state’s legal order. A minority dissenting opinion in the case
was expressed by Justice Shalom Kassan. Justice Kassan argued that the regulations grant-
ing broad emergency powers to the executive and military authorities were undemocratic
and inapplicable:
I cannot act and pass judgment in accordance with the defense regulations which are still on
the statute book. Believing as I do that these laws are essentially invalid, I should not be asked
to act against my conscience merely because the present government has not yet officially
repealed them, though its members declared them illegal as soon as they were passed.… If
the courts of the British Mandate did not cross these laws off the statute book, this court is
honorbound to do so and to utterly eradicate them.43
The positivist majority decision of the Court, however, although expressing similar mis-
givings about the nature of the emergency regulations, held that the judiciary “must accept
the regulations as they are, that is as valid, legal regulations.” The outcome notwithstand-
ing, a clear assumption that the government would annul the regulations in due course
ran through the judgment. In a subsequent case of administrative detention of a Palesti-
nian resident of Jaffa, the Defence (Emergency) Regulations were reaffirmed, although in
this instance the detention order was annulled on procedural grounds.44 Petitions chal-
lenging the validity the Defence Regulations 1939 in the early days of Israel’s existence
were similarly rejected in formalistic terms by the Supreme Court, which refused to accept
that the earlier Regulations had been implicitly repealed by the Law and Administration
Ordinance 1948, or were inconsistent with the Declaration of the Establishment of the
State of Israel.45 In essence, these judgments held that the promise of a new legal order
based on equality, contained in Israel’s declaration of independence, was not legally bind-
ing in character and did not invalidate arbitrary British colonial rules (Jabareen 2016;
Masri 2017).
With the precedent asserted as to the Defence (Emergency) Regulations’ standing, sub-
sequent legal challenges sought instead to contest specific orders issued under the
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Regulations. In the El-Ard case in 1964, permission for the publication of an Arabic-lan-
guage magazine in northern Israel was denied by the authorities on security grounds
under Regulation 94. The association seeking to publish the magazine petitioned the
Supreme Court, claiming the decision was unfounded and discriminatory. The Court
indicated its tendency to defer to the executive and military on security matters and dis-
missed the petition, holding that Regulation 94 does not permit the Supreme Court to
conduct an investigation of the facts and that its judicial review mandate is very limited
under the Regulations.46 In the 1979 Al-Assad case, again arising from denial of a publica-
tion permit under Regulation 94, a Supreme Court majority this time rule that the Minis-
try of Interior should issue the permit. While not required to disclose evidence revealing
the security concerns on which the denial had been based, the authorities in this instance
had failed to fulfil their procedural obligations to provide other specified information to
the Court.47 In a 1980s case arising from very similar facts, the Supreme Court upheld the
decision to withhold the permit on security grounds, as no such procedural mistakes on
the part of the state arose.48
When the inherent problems in the doctrine of emergency are left to one side, two nor-
mative legal questions arise and remain in relation to Israel’s declared state of emergency.
The first is whether Israel’s situation has, since 1948, continued to surpass the threshold
constructed of an impending threat to the life of the nation that is sufficiently grave to
warrant the imposition of an emergency legal framework. The second, given that succes-
sive Israeli governments have argued that the state of emergency has reached the neces-
sary threshold, is whether the measures enacted in the state of emergency paradigm are a
necessary and proportionate response to the perceived threat. These are legal issues that
continue to plague a number of states, often marked by deficits of judicial supervision,
and have preoccupied the case law and commentary of international human rights bodies.
It was concerns over both of these questions that prompted legal activists to seek judicial
review of Israel’s declared state of emergency.
In 1999, the Association for Civil Rights in Israel (ACRI) submitted a petition to the
Supreme Court against the legislature, challenging the constitutionality of the continued
state of emergency, and seeking its annulment. The petition argued that the Knesset’s per-
sistent renewal and extension of a state of emergency has transgressed Israeli constitu-
tional law and international legal norms, on the basis that Israel’s security circumstances
are not of such extraordinary status as to justify an extraordinary regime that subverts lib-
eral understandings of rule of law and separation of powers. It was put forward that, in
contrast to the purported intentions of the doctrine of emergency (here construed in a
favourable light, detached from its own imperial history) to enable the implementation of
urgent and necessary measures for a limited duration, Israel’s state of emergency was per-
manent in time and unlimited in scope – and thus unlawful. ACRI further submitted that
the declared emergency enabled the imposition of legislation and regulations that violate
property rights, that unduly hamper free expression, association and assembly, and that
contravene Israel’s own Basic Laws.
As hearings proceeded following the outbreak of the second Palestinian intifada in
2000, the Supreme Court under former Chief Justice Aharon Barak suggested that the
petition should be withdrawn given the exacerbated security situation. ACRI submitted
an amended petition in 2003, which argued that even in a context of heightened threats to
security the use of emergency powers should be minimal in time and scope, and that
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Israel’s state of emergency declaration was still unfounded. The state’s response (with the
government of Israel now added to the Knesset as a respondent) claimed that repeal of
the emergency would create a legal vacuum and deprive the authorities of the necessary
means of suppressing threats to security. The government did emphasise its intention to
move away from the (declared) state of emergency, and told the Court that it would con-
tinue to take steps to amend or replace legislation that is contingent on the existence of a
formal emergency.
The Ministry of Justice provided the Court with ongoing notifications regarding the
revocation and replacement of certain pieces of emergency legislation. The authorities
presented the seemingly contradictory position that although a state of emergency contin-
ues to exist in fact, the state of emergency in law should be gradually phased out. What
can be inferred from this is both a tacit acknowledgment that the factual situation does
not justify the application of exceptional emergency legalities and, at the same time, a con-
flicting assumption that those exceptional legalities should be subsumed into the “normal”
legal order over time.
The Supreme Court essentially agreed that while the continuing state of emergency is
not ideal, it is a necessary “transitional” measure. Although acknowledging in regard to
the legal framework that “the present situation must not remain unchanged,” the Court
has consistently framed the issue as a “complex and sensitive” one in which the authorities
must be left with a generous margin of flexibility.49 In an interim decision of August 2006,
the Court rejected ACRI’s claim that Israel’s situation was not in fact one of an ongoing
state of emergency: “the war with terror is raging at full force, and it is impossible to disre-
gard this.”50 At the same time, the Court noted that “the state of emergency has been
exploited for statutory matters regarding which balanced legislation could have been
enacted long ago.”51 The Court gave the respondents time to institute changes to civil leg-
islation that was tied to the state of emergency, and by 2011 was satisfied that:
Progress has been made in the legislative processes. Part of the legislation that was contingent
on the state of emergency was altered and amended, another part is in various stages of the
legislative process, and there is an intent to regularise the remainder.52
Accordingly, in May 2012, after twelve hearings over the course of twelve years, the Court
issued a twelve-page judgment (half of which comprises background information and
summaries of the arguments) concluding that the petition had “run its course” and should
be dismissed.53 Israel, according to the Court, continued to face a state of emergency, with
the judgment asserting that “the winds of war have never ceased to blow, and unfortu-
nately the situation remains relatively unchanged.”54 Justice Rubinstein’s opinion, on
behalf of the Court, evokes Israel’s siege mentality with lengthy descriptions of “the
unending threats of our enemies from near and far.” He quotes an extract from a ruling
of the Court in the early 1980s – roughly the half-way point of Israel’s state of emergency
to date - from which it was clear that little had changed in the Court’s approach in the
subsequent thirty years:
As known, the state of emergency has lasted for over 30 years, and who knows how much
longer it will continue. The fact that the state of emergency persists does, on the one hand,
mandate the reduction of the emergency means the state employs to defend its existence so
that, as much as possible, these means will not violate civil rights, but on the other hand, the
continuing state of emergency, owing to well-known reasons and circumstances, points to
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the fact that it is difficult to compare the situation the State of Israel has been in since its
foundation to that of any other state.55
Rubinstein maintains this narrative of Israeli exceptionalism in his depiction of a normal
country (in that it is an “active democracy in which fundamental rights … are safe-
guarded”) that is not normal (in that it is subject to threats of a gravity faced by no other
“normal” democratic country).56 The gauntlet thrown down by this “unique” situation
thus challenges Israel to construct a juridical order that can respond to the exceptional
threat without compromising the state’s “normality.” Rubinstein commends the state for
its work to date in phasing out and replacing some emergency legislation, and highlights
the need to continue extricating relevant security and anti-terrorism measures from a
declared state of emergency; that is, to embed them instead within the “normal” legal sys-
tem. Before and until this process is complete, it is not the place of the judiciary, the argu-
ment goes, to obstruct executive or legislative renewals of the state of emergency, nor to
restrict the use of necessary powers that remain dependent on the declared state of emer-
gency. Here, the Supreme Court’s accustomed deference to the security agencies is appar-
ent: “this court is not a substitute for the discretion of the authorised agencies.”57
Racial sovereignty and hyperlegality
In his reading of the proliferation of British anti-terrorism legislation enacted since the
late 1990s, Nasser Hussain (2007, 515) describes a structural shift in the law away from
traditional conceptions of emergency powers as reactive and temporary, towards an
understanding of securitisation and security law as part of a larger, permanent “methodol-
ogy of governance.” Hussain emphasises certain mechanisms – the increasing use of
(racialised) classifications of persons in the law, the emergence of intensely bureaucratic
and administrative facets of emergency law, the use of special tribunals and commissions –
that contribute to “hyperlegality” at work. This hyperlegality typifies the contemporary
security state and its “multiplication of laws and legal categories” (Lloyd 2012, 75). Related
to this is the militarisation of policing and the seepage of armed conflict categorisations
into domestic legal contexts via the counter-terrorism paradigm.
We can detect the emergence of a similar move in Israel in the process endorsed by the
Supreme Court. This seeks to construct a framework of permanent extraordinary meas-
ures in order to preserve the control system over the Palestinians, as opposed to properly
disentangling the web of emergency powers spun over the last six decades. The concept of
hyperlegality is echoed here in descriptions of “Israel’s military hyperregulation of every-
day life [which] has been catastrophic for the Palestinians” (Makdisi 2008, 6). Here we
may see how emergency powers can supply the framework for hyperlegality, in the con-
text of the Israeli state’s particular performance of racial sovereignty. In flowing from
heavily racialised emergency and securitisation policies, hyperlegality in this paradigm (as
opposed to generally prevailing intensifications of legalism in many jurisdictions) is vested
with specific discriminatory structures and effects. The normalcy/emergency binary cedes
part of the space of exception to a complementary domain in which the state of emer-
gency is normalised in ordinary legislation58 and bolstered by “super-emergency” meas-
ures during large-scale hostilities.59 The non-contingent emergency laws will of course
remain in place even if the state does follow through on its promise to phase out the
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official state of emergency, and the fluidity of Israel’s disparate emergency legal mecha-
nisms will continue to offer a vehicle for the execution of sovereign will.
This process of incorporating emergency powers into the ordinary legal system is
underway and ongoing. In the summer of 2016, Israel’s Knesset approved the Anti-Terror
Law 2016, an extensive piece of counter-terrorism legislation that had been roundly
criticised by human rights organisations from its early inception as a “draconian” move
designed “to legally anchor the ’state of emergency’ regulations… and turn them into per-
manent legislation.”60 The law was advanced by Minister for Justice Ayelet Shaked, of the
far-right Jewish Home party, as the enactment of her assertion that acts of – and support
for – Palestinian violence “can only be vanquished through appropriate punishment and
deterrence.”61 This legislation applies specifically to Israel and occupied East Jerusalem,
rather than the rest of the West Bank (where Palestinians remain governed by the separate
military law system). It is an omnibus law that replaces a number of existing ordinances
on terrorism and effectively re-imports a raft of provisions from the British Defence
(Emergency) Regulations (which, as we have seen above, still apply in the occupied terri-
tories), as well as other temporary Israeli emergency/security regulations, into permanent
Israeli criminal law. The legislation also introduces new crimes, including offences relating
to public expressions of support or sympathy for groups designated as “terrorist” organi-
sations, and expands the definition of “incitement” such that a link to any likely or actual
act of violence is no longer necessary. Emergency style powers assigned to state authorities
under the law include: sweeping arrest powers, detention without trial, use of secret evi-
dence, suspension of habeas corpus, significantly increased criminal sentences, travel
bans, control orders and computerised surveillance, as well as powers vested personally in
the Minister of Defence to expropriate the homes and property of alleged members of
banned organisations without requiring approval by the courts.
The law allows for a broad interpretation of what constitutes a “terrorist” organisation
(it bears noting that most Palestinian political movements are already designated as such
by Israel), and expands the definition of indictable membership of such organisations to
include “passive members” who play no direct role in the organisation’s activities. It casts
the political activities and expression of Palestinians in Israel – including those of a social,
humanitarian and charitable nature, particularly where they assist Palestinians in the
occupied territories – as suspicious and susceptible to prosecution. As such, the Anti-Ter-
ror Law appears designed to persecute Palestinian citizens – marking them out as suspect
“simply because they are Arab”62 – and to suppress their political activities in support of
Palestinians living under occupation.63 The racial overtones of the legislation are clear –
both in itself, and within the context of the broader matrix of discriminatory law-mak-
ing64 of which it forms part. It is criticised on this basis by Palestinian and left-wing Jew-
ish-Israeli members of the Knesset as “racist and totalitarian,”65 with Ayman Odeh (head
of the “Joint List,” the alliance of the four predominantly Arab-Palestinian political parties
in Israel) reading the law in its imperial context: “I see panic, the panic of the final stage of
all colonialism worldwide. The panic of the French at the end of the occupation of Algeria.
I see the panic of the Americans in the final phase of the occupation of Vietnam.”66
Thus we return to the framing of the colonial present. Emergency modalities, as we
have seen, have occupied a central place in the legal system of the colonised Palestinian
space. Emergency doctrine’s malleability and constructed exceptionality facilitates the
forcible imposition of settler sovereignty, while its legality provides the necessary
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authorisation and veneer of legitimacy. It was, and is, an expression of law as a conduit for
racialised hegemony, as the stage upon which scenes of dispossession are performed. The
separate opinion of Chief Justice Beinisch in the Israeli Supreme Court decision on the
state of emergency is candid in this regard: “The state of emergency declared by law is, to
a large extent, the result of a political outlook."67
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